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Abstract 
States often pool their sovereignty, capacity and resources to provide regionally specific public goods, such as security 
or trade rules, and regional organisations play important roles in international relations as institutions that attempt to 
secure peace and contribute to achieving other similar global policy goals. We observe failures occurring in these 
arrangements and activities in two areas: substance and image. To analytically account for this, we distinguish four 
modes of substance and image change and link these to specific types of failure and (lack of) learning. To empirically 
ground and test our assumptions, we examine instances of image failure in ASEAN (political/security policy) and 
substantive policy failure in EU labour migration policy. In so doing, this article contributes to several different fields of 
study and concepts that have hitherto rarely engaged with one another: analyses of policy failure from public policy, 
and regional integration concerns from area studies and international relations. We conclude with suggestions for ways 
forward to further analyse and understand failures at the international and supranational levels. 
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1. Introduction: Failures in International 
Cooperation—From the Spectacular to the Everyday 
Failures of organisations for beyond-the-state coopera-
tion, including their demise, are prominent in world 
history. When the League of Nations failed to prevent 
the outbreak of World War II, for instance, it was con-
sidered to be malfunctioning and collapsed shortly af-
ter the war, dissolving itself in 1947. Similarly, external 
political shocks, such as the Sino-US rapprochement in 
1972 and the conclusion of the Cold War in 1989, led 
some regional organisations, such as the Asia-Pacific 
Council and the Warsaw Pact Organisation to become 
dysfunctional or irrelevant, resulting in their rapid col-
lapse. But not all international arrangements fail or fail 
so spectacularly and not all failures result in wholesale 
replacement of existing organisational arrangements. 
How these lesser failures occur, how they can be con-
ceptualised, and what their occurrence foreshadows for 
regional arrangements are the subjects of this article. 
Better understanding of the nature of failures at 
this level, the reasons for their variation, their conse-
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quences and what can be done about them, is critical 
for contemporary policy studies and international rela-
tions. Below we explore how policy failure can be de-
fined, identified and, in turn, affect the existing set-up 
of regional organisations. Our framework for analysis 
combines several literatures which rarely speak to each 
other, but should: the literature on public policy (Ben-
nett & Howlett, 1991; Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013; How-
lett, 2012; Radaelli & Dunlop, 2013), organisation 
studies (Dodgson, 1993; Etheredge & Long, 1981; 
Etheredge & Short, 1983; Shrivastava, 1983), and com-
parative politics (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005).  
We see policy failure as generally related to the 
‘institutional design and capacity issues such as organi-
zational and human-resource capability and compe-
tences’ (Howlett, 2012, p. 546) and develop a model of 
failure types taking these factors into account. To em-
pirically ground our assumptions and test this frame-
work we examine two instances of policy failure in 
regional organisations: Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) (political/security policy) and the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) (labour migration). We then discuss 
the significance of our findings with respect to these 
different types of failures and policy learning. 
2. Studying Policy Failures in International 
Organisations: Definitions and Approaches 
The above observations raise several questions about 
failures, their consequences and learning in interna-
tional and regional organisations which scholars of 
public policy and international relations have only be-
gun to address. For instance, do all failures lead to 
sizeable policy change or to less dramatic reforms and 
tinkering with existing arrangements? Or do they 
sometimes lead to no action at all? And, related to 
these: why do some policy failures lead to organisa-
tional collapse, while others do not? To what extent do 
policy failures shape the design of international organi-
sations? Is there a cycle of failure and learning involved 
in the everyday functioning of such organisations? And, 
if so, how do we first detect and then determine which 
‘failure-learning’ mechanism is weak and which is ro-
bust? 
2.1. Defining Policy Failure 
Since an international organisation is essentially an 
embodiment of its member states’ efforts to achieve 
an objective and to resolve broadly-defined policy 
problems or to project the image of collective will, its 
failure to do any or all of these actions would likely 
lead the organisation to restructure its efforts in order 
to increase effectiveness and avoid further organisa-
tional ineffectiveness without restructuring (Hulme & 
Hulme, 2012; Jachtenfuchs, 1996).1 Yet this perspective 
on organisational responses to failure is limiting and 
does not take into account the more subtle ways in 
which a policy or organisation can evolve. In addressing 
the questions about learning and failure at the interna-
tional level set out above, it is important to first better 
conceptualise the possible empirical manifestations of 
policy failures in international organisations as well as 
their links to modes of institutional change, evaluation, 
and learning (Borrás & Højlund, 2015; Stone, 1999, 
2001; Thomas, 1999; Van der Knaap, 1995; Zarkin, 
2008). A better theory and model would take into ac-
count the modes of organisational change which can 
occur and link these to specific mechanisms of reform 
or re-structuring such as policy learning or lesson-
drawing (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Busenberg, 2001; Hu-
ber, 1991; Rose, 1993, 2005).  
In this article we operationalise policy failure based 
on the relativistic concept of ‘contra-policy success’. 
Simply put, as McConnell (2010) and others have ar-
gued, if a policy has not (yet) achieved its objective, it is 
regarded as a ‘failure’.2 To be more precise and to add 
a clearer temporal aspect to this definition, we define 
policy failure as the failure to achieve previously estab-
lished policy objective(s) within a specified time frame, 
often of at least a decade. This definition allows us to 
evaluate success or failure of policy implementation 
                                                          
1 For consistency, we use the term ‘organisation’ throughout 
this article to refer to bureaucratic political entities. We focus 
on beyond-the-nation-state organisations and use 
‘international’ to refer to multilateral inter-state cooperation 
and ‘regional’ to a form of international cooperation involving 
states sharing some geographical similarities. The regional 
organisations we examine are often considered institutions 
because they embody particular sets of rules and norms that 
characterise that inter-state cooperation. Following established 
literature in international relations and comparative politics, 
we see that institutions may endure while organisations 
collapse. We use the terms ‘institutional’ and ‘institution’ when 
engaging with these sets of literature on change and learning.  
2 While academic definition remains contentious, Howlett 
(2012) identifies two mainstream definitions. One is relativistic. 
Since it is difficult to objectively identify ‘success’ and ‘failure’, 
this definition takes the position that the subjective 
assessment of a policy is inevitable, and, thus, depending on 
individual perspectives, a policy can be considered to have 
failed or succeeded. The other approach defines failure as 
anything opposite of policy success. The two definitions have 
their own merits, but also limitations. The former implicitly 
focuses on the consequence of policy implementation, while 
acknowledging that it is subjectively interpreted. As a result, 
policy failure may be defined in an arbitrary manner. The other 
definition is relatively objective because it focuses on the 
process of policy implementation; yet, such a dichotomy 
between success and failure will miss some nuanced 
interpretations of the implementation process, not to mention 
the possible causal relationship between policy outputs and 
policy outcomes. We therefore synthesise both definitions in 
our own. 
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vis-à-vis the original policy objective(s) as a reference 
point, while setting a time frame around this assess-
ment (Howlett, 2012; McConnell, 2010). The time frame 
may vary by issue area in most cases, but the 10-year 
rule established by Sabatier (1987) for the evaluation of 
policy change may be taken as a default if no alternative 
specific time frame was articulated in the policy. 
While most work on policy failures has focussed on 
the domestic level (McConnell, 2010), and has high-
lighted the different political, problem and process as-
pects of failures, in international relations we posit two 
main types of policy activity which constitute distinct 
realms of failure. The first type concerns policy sub-
stance related specifically to the degree of attainment 
of the aims of a policy. For example, if an organisation 
attempts to create a free trade area (FTA) among its 
member states, the degree of FTA implementation 
would be the topic for evaluation. We may identify pol-
icy failures of substance in international organisations 
when such an objective has not been met within a 
specified time frame set or agreed by its member 
states or within the 10-year rule as mentioned above.  
The second type of policy objective is subtler and 
concerns organisational processes and image. This is 
related to the need for international organisations to 
reach some modicum level of agreement or a unified 
stance or position among member states on a course 
of action to pursue rather than upon the actual imple-
mentation of substantive policy content. Image, per-
haps more than substance, is important for many 
international organisations (Knopf, 1998), especially 
those seeking to project an image of democracy, stabil-
ity, security or the rule of law. Indeed, we often find 
that international organisations place a very high value 
on issuing joint communiqués or declarations because 
these statements legitimise their existence as well as 
individual member states’ actions outside of their or-
ganisational framework (Nilsson et al., 2009; Oberthür, 
2009). This emphasis on image distinguishes interna-
tional organisations from many other types of organi-
sations, including domestic states, although, too, in 
other spheres this same concern may sometimes be 
seen. It follows that we may identify policy failures of 
image when an international organisation does not 
project the image it would like. 
But when and where do these failures in interna-
tional organisations occur? Following Howlett (2012), 
we argue that ‘failure’ can be visible at any stage of the 
policy cycle, for example, when: an unattainable policy 
agenda is established in agenda-setting (hence leading 
to policy failure, or failure to reach a decision); design-
ing a policy without investigating or understanding the 
causes of the problems in policy formulation (so that 
solutions do not match problems); failing to decide on 
a policy or distorting its intents during decision-making 
(political manipulation of policy levers for other, such 
as electoral, ends); failing to implement a policy effec-
tively in policy implementation (deliberate or uninten-
tional neglect or incompetence); and failing to learn 
due to weak policy monitoring and feedback processes 
in policy evaluation (mismatch between the evaluative 
capacity and the task an organisation faces).  
It remains an outstanding empirical question at 
which point in their activities specific failures of sub-
stance and failures of image in international organisa-
tions occur (Chou, 2012) and why this happens. These 
questions are addressed in the case studies set out be-
low. However, a major area of attention in works on 
policy failure (Boin & Otten, 1996; Bovens & t’Hart, 
1995, 1996; Bovens, t’Hart, & Peters, 2001; Deverell, 
2009; Deverell & Hansén, 2009; Moynihan, 2008, 2009) 
concerns the role of policy learning, or its lack, in off-
setting or fulminating crises which often accompany or 
lead to failures of both substance and image.  
Our central argument is that the features of inter-
national organisations matter in both cases: they con-
tribute to determining the likely tendency of a 
particular type of policy change (substance or image) 
to occur and for a specific type of learning process to 
emerge which may be capable of correcting the prob-
lem at the present time and avoiding it reoccurring in 
the future.  
2.2. Policy Change and Policy Learning: Four Types of 
Learning Processes 
Works on policy learning in general have focussed on 
the governmental or non-governmental aspects of les-
son-drawing, including the behaviour of specific kinds 
of organisations such as think tanks and research insti-
tutes involved in knowledge generation and dissemina-
tion (Ladi, 2005; Rose, 1993; Stone, 1999). These 
studies have often distinguished between learning 
about policy tools or means (Bennett & Howlett, 1991) 
and learning about policy goals (Hall, 1993; Leys & 
Vanclay, 2011), and have highlighted variations in the 
speed of change (rapid vs. slow) (Hall, 1993) which are 
useful distinctions that will be developed further in the 
context of international organisations below. Few stud-
ies, unfortunately, have focussed on how the processes 
of policy change and learning, or non-learning, or 
learning the wrong lessons can affect these processes. 
This is especially true for studies of international 
multilateral cooperation (cf. Gallarotti, 1991). Interna-
tional organisations in fact have rarely been examined 
from a learning perspective, especially after an observ-
able failure, and thus constitute a new venue for re-
search into the subject and its consequences. In this 
context, works by Streeck and Thelen (2005) in com-
parative political studies provide a useful typology of 
policy change processes which can be linked to several 
key dimensions of the subject to help better situate the 
processes of image and substantive failures in interna-
tional organisations described above.  
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In their work, Streeck and Thelen (2005, pp. 19-30) 
describe four distinct modes of institutional change, 
which are relevant to the case of all organisations, in-
cluding international ones and helpful in better under-
standing the role of learning in organisational change.3 
These are:  
1) Displacement (‘the removal of existing tools and 
goals and the introduction of new ones’), often 
caused by exhaustion (gradual ‘institutional 
breakdown’);  
2) Layering (‘the introduction of new rules on top 
of or alongside existing ones within a similar 
goal framework’);  
3) Drift (‘the changed impact of existing rules due 
to shifts in the environment’); and 
4) Conversion (‘the redeployment of existing insti-
tutions and instruments towards new goals’). 
Based on several studies which have examined how 
these change processes unfold in institutional and or-
ganisational contexts, we hypothesise that substantive 
and image failures in international organisations in-
volve different kinds of change processes and out-
comes. More specifically, we argue substantive failures 
typically involve layering and conversion processes af-
fecting the policy tools employed, while image failures 
tend to occur through drift and displacement processes 
affecting policy goals (Baker, 2013; Béland, 2007; 
Shpaizman, 2014).  
Further, looking at the kinds of activities in which 
international organisations are involved, we argue that 
the degree of difficulty in implementing trans-national 
cooperation depends very much on the issue area, and 
this is especially true when material interests, such as 
trade, finance, and natural resources, are involved. We 
thus expect substantive policy implementation which 
affects such interests directly, to be cautious, slow, and 
long-term. Image change, on the other hand, is less 
likely to involve such actors and hence can be much 
more abrupt. This is especially the case given the zero-
sum and veto-laden consensus styles of decision-
                                                          
3 Exhaustion and displacement are two closely linked processes 
that are difficult to empirically distinguish in cases of 
international cooperation and hence are treated here as one 
type (as do Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). 
making practised by most international organisations. 
We juxtapose the different processes and speeds of 
change set out above to arrive at the typology of inter-
national organisational change set out in Table 1. 
This begs the questions of how these kinds of fail-
ures are related to (non)learning. We expect to find dif-
ferent learning processes underway in different 
organisations depending on the kinds of change pro-
cesses occurring.  
Specifically, we expect substantive learning in layer-
ing processes to focus on marginal changes to instru-
ments and in conversion processes to be linked to the 
ideational or ideological aspects of tool use. This is be-
cause an organisation when facing a slow and low level 
substantive failure tends to continuously aim to 
achieve the original goal by deploying a new instru-
ment or refining an old one. With a more rapid and 
higher level of substantive failure, the organisation 
faces a situation in which policy progress is deemed to 
be essential and crucial for achieving objective and 
learning, in this instance, is likely to be associated with 
deliberation and debate not only about instrument cal-
ibrations but also about the ultimate ability of different 
types of policy instruments to achieve policy goals.  
On the other hand, in image change situations we 
expect to see drift processes linked to a focus on the 
contextual aspects of policy goals and displacement 
processes to involve analysis of both goals and means 
in all their dimensions. Specifically, learning in drift 
processes depends on actors becoming aware of the 
changing organisational context and environment and 
their divergence with agreed policy goals. It is likely to 
be a slow process because of the initial divide (i.e. dis-
agreements between actors) that has led to image fail-
ure in the first instance. With the recoverable degree 
of image failure, learning in a drift process would see 
an organisation attempting to adjust its original policy 
goals to a new environment despite its changed im-
pact. The organisation’s foremost concern is to main-
tain its image or to project unity in public rather than 
to substantially achieve the goal. With an unrecovera-
ble degree of image failure, learning will encompass 
both the original organisational or policy goals set out 
and the means to achieve them.  
This chain of failure, change processes and learning 
subjects and types is set out in Table 2. 
Table 1. Taxonomy of international policy change. 
Type of Failure Key Change Element Typical Change Process Speed of Change 
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Table 2. Learning and types of policy failure. 
Type of failure Key change elements & 
speed characteristics 
Associated learning process Learning subjects & type 
Substantive Instruments, Slow 
Instruments, Rapid 
Layering & Learning 
Conversion & Learning 
Instruments, Marginal 
Instruments, Ideational 
Image Goals, Slow 
Goals, Rapid 
Drift & Learning 
Displacement & Learning 
Goals, Contextual 
Goals and Means, Analytical 
 
3. Testing the Framework: Two Case Studies of Policy 
Failures in Regional Organisations 
Applying this framework to two case studies of policy 
change beyond the national level allows us to test 
these hypotheses in the context of regional organisa-
tions and policy development. In this section, we com-
pare policy failures in two such organisations to see if 
the expected relationships between failure types and 
learning processes hold. The cases of ASEAN and the 
EU are used to consider one case each of substance 
and image failure. We selected ASEAN and the EU as 
our cases because both have successfully survived the 
Cold War and the post-Cold War era, yet they are often 
criticised for their inability to further regional coopera-
tion in Asia and Europe beyond the maintenance of the 
general status quo or, indeed, as is the case of post-
Brexit EU, even the status quo. At the same time, 
ASEAN and the EU are also two cases exhibiting differ-
ent organisational traits. For instance, the EU is one of 
the most sophisticated supranational bureaucracies in 
the world, with entities such as the European Commis-
sion, Parliament, and a Court of Justice designed to ex-
ercise independent executive, legislative, and judiciary 
powers across multiple policy sectors. By contrast, 
ASEAN is far less institutionalised and has no entities as 
comparatively bureaucratised and powerful as the 
EU’s. Their shared external perception and distinct or-
ganisational characteristics provide a comparative en-
try point from which to examine the relationship 
between organisational features, failure, and learning 
in general.  
3.1. Dealing with ASEAN Image Failure: Failing to Be 
United and Learning to Drift 
At its inception in 1967, ASEAN never envisioned itself 
engaging with security affairs, but in the post-Cold War 
period, it made two significant changes: inclusion of a 
security agenda and establishment of security-oriented 
entities with external powers’ participation, such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit 
(EAS). ASEAN then began to confront security issues in 
the region.  
Admittedly, partly due to ASEAN’s non-binding na-
ture, and partly due to member states’ differing securi-
ty interests within and beyond the region (cf. Koga, 
2010a, 2010b), ASEAN’s capability to manage these is-
sues with any substance is significantly limited and it is 
often called a ‘talk shop’. Nevertheless, through its 
numerous dialogues, ASEAN produces joint statements 
and declaration, and consciously tries to project an im-
age of its ‘unified’ stance to the international commu-
nity. ASEAN is thus an image-based organisation in the 
security field, and one of its broader objectives is to 
maintain the image of a ‘unified’ stance towards re-
gional political and security issues. 
ASEAN thus encountered a serious image failure 
when its members did not adopt a joint communiqué 
on the South China Sea issue in 13 July 2012. This fail-
ure negatively impacted its image of organisational co-
herence as ASEAN had consistently issued joint 
communiqués every year since 1967 following its an-
nual foreign ministerial meetings (AMM). This was 
done regularly, no matter how unsubstantial the con-
tent of the communiqué became. It was hence a sym-
bol of ASEAN solidarity and the organisation carefully 
reproduced such an image each year since its incep-
tion. Therefore, the failure to issue one in 2012 was 
seen as a significant indicator of discord and dysfunc-
tion within the organisation.  
The main cause of this failure stemmed from inter-
nal disagreement between the Philippines and Cambo-
dia in ironing out the wording about territorial disputes 
in the South China Sea to be included in the joint com-
muniqué. ASEAN’s basic political stance over the terri-
torial disputes in the South China Sea can be 
summarised as ‘maintaining neutrality and regional 
stability’. ASEAN would not support any claims regard-
ing these territorial disputes. Yet ASEAN was concerned 
about a potential disruption of the safety of sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) caused by claimant states’ 
skirmishes and conflicts in the area, and thus it was 
willing to facilitate dialogues for their peaceful resolu-
tion. With this posture, ASEAN created the ‘Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ (DoC) 
in 2002 as a guideline of actions over the area. In addi-
tion, ASEAN and China discussed the creation of a Code 
of Conduct (CoC) to legally constrain claimant states’ 
behaviour.  
In this context, the tension between the Philippines 
and China over one particular disputed territory, the 
Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, heightened 
from 8 April 2012, when the Philippines’ naval ships at-
tempted to arrest eight Chinese fishery boats staying 
‘too’ close to the Shoal. In response, China immediately 
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dispatched two patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisher-
ies Administration and blocked the Philippines’ naval 
ships to prevent them from arresting Chinese fishery 
boats, resulting in a two-month maritime stand-off.  
Reacting to this, the Philippines proposed to include 
a condemnation statement against China into the 2012 
AMM joint communiqué. However, this triggered an in-
ternal division within ASEAN. Cambodia’s Prime Minis-
ter Hun Sen emphasised the importance of reducing 
tensions with China and a code of conduct in the South 
China Sea (“Hun calls for ASEAN South China Sea code,” 
2012), insisting that a naming and shaming strategy 
would only exacerbate the situation (“ASEAN agrees 
not to mention territorial row,” 2012; “Vietnam, Phil-
ippines ‘bullying’ ASEAN over sea conflict,” 2012). Laos, 
Myanmar, and Thailand supposedly supported Cambo-
dia’s position (Manthorpe, 2012) and the Cambodian 
Ambassador to Singapore, Sin Serey, reiterated this po-
sition in August by way of accusing the Philippines for 
its failure to reduce tension in the region (“S. China Sea 
code of conduct in the works,” 2012). The Philippines 
then criticised Cambodia as being too close to China 
and promoting Chinese interests (“Naval dispute sinks 
ASEAN summit talks,” 2012; “Xinhua interviews Chi-
nese deputy foreign minister,” 2012). It insisted the re-
cent development in the South China Sea would affect 
the stability in Southeast Asia and the members’ inter-
ests were at stake. According to the Philippines’ Foreign 
Undersecretary, Erlinda Basilio, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam supported this view 
(Basilio, 2012). ASEAN was decisively split on the matter, 
resulting in non-issuance of a joint communiqué. 
The failure to issue a joint communiqué at AMM 
raised the question of ASEAN’s credibility. Although 
ASEAN was generally expected to produce an abstract 
statement to project its image of unity, it became in-
creasingly clear that when there was a strong conflict 
of interest among the member states, ASEAN could 
easily become dysfunctional. Several ASEAN members 
expressed this concern and argued that, if ASEAN failed 
to develop a collective position, it would lose influence 
over regional great powers. These included Singapore’s 
Foreign Minister K. Shanmugan and Malaysia’s Foreign 
Minister Anifah Aman (Ghosh, 2012; “South China Sea 
dispute could affect ASEAN’s image,” 2012; “Unity be-
fore China urged,” 2012).  
Several ASEAN member states and secretary gen-
eral also perceived this risk and attempted to restore 
its organisational image (“Maritime disputes trouble 
Asian bloc,” 2012; “S. China Sea code of conduct in the 
works,” 2012). This effort led ASEAN members to grad-
ually avoid in-depth, contentious discussions regarding 
the South China Sea issue within AMM, while keeping 
other unrelated agendas on the table. Instead, they at-
tempted to use different ASEAN venues for discussing 
the issue. In July 2012, while failing to issue a joint 
communiqué, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to man-
date ASEAN senior officials to meet with representa-
tives from China for further discussions on the CoC 
(“ASEAN adopts common stand,” 2012). Also, in No-
vember 2012, when the ASEAN summit and related fo-
rums were held, the Philippines invited the United 
States to discuss the matter (“ASEAN seeks to calm sea 
disputes,” 2012). International and regional powers, 
such as the United States and Australia, showed their 
willingness to discuss the South China Sea issue be-
cause it was important for the security of SLOCs and 
regional stability (“Obama tackles Wen on sea feud,” 
2012a; “PM pushes China on maritime claims,” 2012b). 
Given this, the ASEAN members moved its designated 
venue for this issue from the AMM to other forums 
that included great power members.  
In sum, facing this policy failure at the AMM, ASEAN 
did not reform the AMM as an organisational entity. An 
image-based organisation’s policy failure could have an 
enormous impact and produce rapid changes, leading 
to change through displacement. But this did not hap-
pen. The ASEAN case instead illustrates that no organi-
sational change followed the policy failure and rather 
highlighted a particular aspect of learning and drift. 
That is, while the objective of ASEAN’s dispute settle-
ment practice remained the same, shifts in its envi-
ronment made it difficult to sustain existing practices. 
However, this became possible when ASEAN deferred 
the matter to a satellite venue (the EAS) and the organ-
isation was able to conduct a ‘run-around’—buying 
time for acceptable solutions to present themselves, or 
pretending to do so. This allowed the AMM to return 
to its status quo ante, which in turn contributed to the 
continuation of projecting an image of ASEAN unity, 
ameliorating the earlier failure.4  
3.2. Dealing with EU Substance Failure: Failing to 
Attract the ‘Best-and-Brightest’? 
The ASEAN case shows how particular kinds of learning 
are related to image-based policy issues and failures. 
The second case presented here, on EU cooperation on 
labour migration, illustrates the learning dynamics oc-
curring in a substantive issue area.5  
                                                          
4 At the same time, we note this organisational ‘run-around’ is 
possible because ASEAN established several affiliated entities 
in the past. If none existed, ASEAN may have created a new 
entity to discuss the issue informally or formally, or exhibit 
displacement or drift. In this sense, this case illustrates that 
institutional change and learning are likely to depend on not 
only the type of organisation, but also the organisational 
structure, which determines the strategies that organisational 
actors could employ to cope with policy failure. 
5 The current and on-going crisis concerning asylum-seeking 
and undocumented migrants arriving on the shores of Europe 
is another excellent case for applying our proposed approach. 
Given the space limitation, we are unable to include both the 
asylum-seeking and labour migration as cases in this sub-
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Migration cooperation has been contentious since 
the very beginning of the EU (see Chou, 2009, for an 
overview) and has become much more so in the very 
recent past. Indeed, the original EU members never in-
tended to engage in this area of cooperation and only 
did so to achieve a core integration objective: the free 
movement of persons within the European labour 
force. When the EU removed internal border controls 
against its citizens, however, it also saw ‘unwanted’ 
secondary movement of asylum applicants and unau-
thorised migration. Hence, the first measures and poli-
cies adopted in the migration field revolved around 
how to strengthen the common external borders 
through, for example, creating a common visa regime, 
signing readmission agreements with non-EU countries 
(the ‘Neighbourhood’ and beyond), and the mutual 
recognition of asylum status. It was not until the adop-
tion of the 1999 Tampere conclusions, and its subse-
quent re-endorsement at The Hague and Stockholm, 
that a more ‘comprehensive’ outlook entered into Eu-
ropean policy parlance and cooperation spread to oth-
er forms of migration such as family reunification and 
international labour migration (Council, 1999).6  
The Commission presented the first Tampere la-
bour migration policy proposal in 2001 with a deadline 
of 1 May 2004 for its completion. This measure—the 
Council directive on the conditions of entry and resi-
dence of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
paid and self-employed economic activities 
(Commission, 2001)—had it been adopted, would in-
troduce a set of directly binding common conditions 
under which a joint residence and work permit would 
be issued to a foreign worker. The policy idea was that, 
if the applicants satisfied the requirements for obtain-
ing work permits, there was no need to repeat the bu-
reaucratic process for obtaining the residence permit.  
This proposal is an excellent example of an outright 
substantive and procedural failure within an interna-
tional organisation. The EU member states’ migration 
ministers, sitting in the configuration of the Council of 
Ministers, considered the Commission’s proposal in-
tensely throughout 2002, but little progress was made. 
The lack of policy progress was due to national opposi-
tion; member states refused to discuss the proposal on 
the grounds that there was no EU legal basis for the 
use of this policy instrument (Council, 2003). When the 
                                                                                           
section. However, we would like to point out that the EU’s fail-
ure in fostering a holistic labour migration policy to apply to all 
skill levels is not entirely unrelated to the current crisis revolv-
ing around asylum-seeking. 
6 The organisational features of EU labour migration policy 
cooperation have evolved dramatically over the years: from 
intergovernmental consensus-seeking decision-making to the 
‘ordinary’ procedure under the Lisbon Treaty (see Cerna & 
Chou, 2014, for how this led to different outcomes in the 
labour migration field). The member states, however, still have 
the final say about admission numbers for economic migrants.  
Council refused to negotiate, the Commission with-
drew the proposal in March 2006.  
What kind of policy failure was this? To begin, it is 
clear this failure is one of substance since a substantive 
policy (i.e. an EU directive) failed to be adopted or im-
plemented. We need, however, to examine how the 
Commission prepared for its ‘comeback’ in the labour 
migration domain in order to be more precise about 
how and why the original 2001 proposal had failed. 
Even before it withdrew its proposal in 2006, the 
Commission officials responsible for the dossier real-
ised that they needed to adopt another approach for 
labour migration issues (Chou, 2009). These Commis-
sion officials prepared for the new approach firstly by 
carrying out informal discussions with the member 
states. In these talks the Commission identified what 
could be the EU’s added-value in labour migration reg-
ulation (Chou, 2009) and then in January 2005 issued a 
Green Paper on ‘managing economic migration’, which 
asked whether there was a need to set out common EU 
instruments for admitting foreign workers (Commission, 
2005). Based on the responses from the public and 
stakeholder groups, the Commission concluded that 
the majority of the respondents supported a labour 
migration policy at the regional level.  
The Commission’s preparations tell us that the ini-
tial substantive policy failure was the result of failure at 
three different policy stages: agenda-setting (the 
Commission pushed an unattainable policy agenda by 
proposing the directive for a joint residence and work 
permit); policy formulation (the Commission failed to 
take into consideration what the member states actu-
ally wanted in terms of cooperation in the labour mi-
gration field); and decision-making (the member states 
blocked the Commission proposal by arguing that there 
was no treaty basis for this initiative).  
By identifying where it had failed, the Commission 
was able to learn and re-launch the momentum in EU 
labour migration policy cooperation. For instance, the 
responses from the Green Paper gave the Commission 
popular legitimacy in setting out a new policy agenda 
for labour migration. By informally soliciting the mem-
ber states’ inputs to the labour migration policy agen-
da, which was crucial for policy formulation, the 
Commission was able to parse out in what the member 
states were primarily interested: an EU measure that 
would address a specific subset of migrants—the highly 
skilled. By contrast, the failed 2001 directive addressed 
all categories of migrant workers and sought to set out 
their rights once they were admitted to the EU. 
The Commission’s learning and careful preparation 
following its original failure thus led to the successful 
adoption of the first of several EU labour migration 
measures.7 The failed 2001 proposal delimited how la-
                                                          
7 In October 2007, the Commission presented the newest EU 
initiative in labour migration: the EU Blue Card (formally known 
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bour migration policy cooperation would be under-
stood at the supranational-level: EU policies in this area 
would firstly address the highly skilled before others 
would be considered. This is thus an example of learn-
ing through conversion in which EU policy discussions 
on labour migration would be strategically redeployed 
to relate in the first instance to the recruitment of for-
eign talent, with existing and subsequent policy instru-
ments (such as the Scientific Visa and the EU Blue Card) 
configured to achieve this end before other labour mi-
gration measures were considered and adopted.  
4. Analysis, Conclusions and Ways Forward 
In this article, we set out an analytical framework that 
allows us to better understand the nature of policy 
failures in international organisations and the mecha-
nisms, such as learning, by which they occur and may 
be overcome. Our goal was to identify and connect 
specific failure types with the likely modes of institu-
tional change that could ultimately lead to organisa-
tional and policy transformation, and to better 
understand their linkages with modes of learning. Our 
framework distinguished between two kinds of policy 
failures associated with the workings, outputs and out-
comes of international organisations: failure in sub-
stance and failure in image. We hypothesised that 
these different types of failure would exhibit different 
                                                                                           
as the directive on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment) (Council, 2009). While this proposal ‘fit’ what the 
member states favoured, there was still considerable 
disagreement among them from the outset. For instance, 
Cerna and Chou (2014) tell us that there were, in the main, five 
sets of objections. Similar to the failed 2001 proposal, several 
member states rejected the proposal on the grounds of 
‘sovereignty’ and referenced The Hague programme’s 
proclamation that ‘the determination of volumes of admission 
of labour migrants is a competence of the Member States’ 
(Council, 2004). The second objection came from the new 
member states (Czech Republic and Slovakia) and revolved 
around the transition period placed on the free movement of 
their nationals: these member states could not support 
recruiting foreign talent when their citizens were barred from 
accessing the other member states’ labour markets. The third 
set of objections concerned the definition of highly skilled 
migrants (there were none) and salary threshold the applicant 
must evidence (how much higher should it be in comparison to 
those of EU workers?). The fourth was about lowering the 
admissions barriers to young professionals. And the fifth was 
about the rights to which Blue Card holders would be entitled. 
When the policy proposal was finally adopted in 2009, it 
embodied nearly the lowest-common-denominator: most of 
the rights for the admitted highly skilled migrants were 
removed or moved up to the preamble (which meant that the 
articles were guiding and not binding); admissions 
requirements were made more restrictive (e.g. the salary 
threshold the highly skilled migrant needed to earn would be 
higher than the average EU workers).  
characteristics in terms of speed and the types of 
learning which would allow them to be overcome. 
We argued that different modes of institutional 
change (layering, drift, conversion, and displacement) 
identified in earlier studies of long-term institutional 
development and change can be connected to sub-
stance-based and image-based organisations and to 
policy learning. Organisational features such as rela-
tive veto likelihood and the overall material capabili-
ties of an organisation in policy implementation (i.e. 
its ability to realise or adopt a specific policy position) 
shape what kind of policy failure, image or substance, 
is likely to occur and specific learning types can be 
linked to specific change processes common in each 
case. We expected substantive learning in layering 
processes to focus on marginal changes to instru-
ments and in conversion processes to be linked to the 
ideational or ideological aspects of tool use. In learn-
ing situations for image-based organisations, we ex-
pected to see drift processes linked to a focus on the 
contextual aspects of policy goals and displacement 
processes to the analysis of both goals and means in 
all their dimensions. 
We applied this framework to two instances of 
policy failure in two regional organisations—ASEAN 
and the EU—one a case of image failure and the other 
of substance, and found the following. As the EU case 
shows, policy failure in substance may be quite subtle 
and nuanced in dealing with policy tool calibrations 
and uses and may take years to become visible, both 
empirically and in terms of the judgments of relevant 
policy actors (McConnell, 2010). On the other hand, 
as anticipated, the ASEAN case illustrates, policy im-
plementation where image is of central aim is gener-
ally less nuanced and appears more quickly. This is 
because, unlike policy substance, organisational im-
age is a straightforward political act, and once the 
members of an organisation agree to establish a co-
operative scheme by producing joint declarations or 
statements, it more or less automatically produces a 
positive image of their political unity (May, 1992, 
1999). Ipso facto, image failure also occurs quickly fol-
lowing a failed decision.8  
We found by moving the controversial issue out of 
the AMM and into satellite venues where discussions 
are less prominent, ASEAN members were able to 
avoid drastic changes and damages to its reputation. 
The drift process followed in this case and the specific 
method followed—organisational ‘run-around’—is a 
form of incremental transformation and manifestations 
                                                          
8 This is unlike the domestic situation where there is usually a 
state monopoly on decision-making power, and the state does 
not have to consider other states’ interests in most 
circumstances, so that image concerns are largely secondary to 
considerations of substantive failure (Howlett, 2012; Scharpf, 
1988). 
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of learning in international organisations facing this 
kind of failure and should be a subject of more detailed 
inquiry and investigation in future works. 
Our EU case study, on the other hand, is an exam-
ple of how a policy failure in substance can be over-
come through learning and lesson-drawing. We found 
the failure to adopt an EU directive on a joint residence 
and work permit for foreign workers during the Tam-
pere period to have been reconfigured to allow the uti-
lisation of existing tools related primarily to the 
recruitment and regulation of highly skilled migrants. 
What the EU case revealed is that there is an opera-
tional policy cycle of substantive failure and political 
learning (on the part of the European Commission) that 
is involved in the daily functions of regional organisa-
tions like the EU. When the Commission officials real-
ised that their 2001 proposal was unlikely to be 
adopted, they embarked on a learning exercise of solic-
iting and fine-tuning through continuous dialogue with 
national migration ministers that helped shape the 
outcome of its second labour migration policy pro-
posal. This is an example of institutional change exhib-
iting conversion change patterns, again as our 
framework anticipated. 
Thus both cases have shown our analytical frame-
work to be a useful starting point to examining policy 
failures in international organisations and how they 
can be overcome through learning. It also illustrates 
how several aspects of the framework should be fur-
ther refined. This includes issues such as the utility of 
organisational ‘run-around’ to avoid failure, the issue 
of organisational capacity related to substantive goal 
achievement and re-definition as well as the conditions 
of the success or failure of policy learning as both our 
cases are examples of successful learning. However, 
better defining the object of attention—policy failures 
in international organisations—in both substantive and 
image terms, and linking these two types of failure to 
different learning styles and processes is a significant 
step forward in better understanding, and avoiding, 
policy failures beyond the national level, a subject 
heretofore rarely examined in the policy failure litera-
ture and not well understood in the literature on inter-
national relations. 
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